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Bernadette A. Meyler
Under the constitutional vision articulated last year in 
the Supreme Court’s Ten Commandments decisions, 
it seems that particular clauses of the Constitution 
import within themselves a kind of emergency escape 
clause, or interpretive direction, warning judicial users: 
“Do not apply if overly divisive.” The majority in the 
case involving exhibits of the Ten Commandments in 
Kentucky courthouses, McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, ap-
plied a familiar standard in holding that the displays 
violated the Establishment Clause. The plurality and 
concurrence in the Texas case, Van Orden v. Perry, 
although concluding that the statue commemorating 
the Ten Commandments should remain standing on 
the State Capitol grounds, refrained from adopting 
any such orderly approach. Indeed, Justice Breyer’s 
tie-breaking vote appears to have been primarily based 
on the attempt to avoid the strife that removing a 
monument reciting the Ten Commandments might 
have occasioned.
 Far from representing a radical exercise in judicial 
“say-so,” as Justice Scalia would have it, the decision 
that the courthouses of two counties in Kentucky 
could not constitutionally persist in foregrounding 
the Ten Commandments as part of a display on “The 
Foundations of American Law and Government,” 
demonstrated a rather traditional reliance upon the 
Court’s established precedents. Justice Souter, writing 
for the fi ve-member majority, rigorously applied the 
fi rst prong of the three-part test derived from Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, a 1971 case holding certain types of 
state fi nancial aid to religious schools unconstitutional. 
From this, he concluded that the events leading up to 
the counties’ presentation of the displays—including 
several forerunner exhibitions and county legislative 
resolutions stating that the Ten Commandments are 
“the precedent legal code upon which the civil and 
criminal codes of . . . Kentucky are founded”—showed 
that no predominantly secular purpose underlay the 
courthouse exhibitions.
 Nor are the substantive criticisms that the dissent 
leveled at the deployment of this “secular purpose” 
standard particularly persuasive. As the majority artic-
ulated it, the test bore substantial resemblance to those 
in other segments of the Court’s jurisprudence—in-
cluding equal protection and voting rights. Some of 
the dissenters themselves have endorsed reconciling 
the Court’s reasoning under the Religion Clauses with 
approaches in similar areas of constitutional law, and 
have been instrumental in generating those other ap-
proaches. In a 1993 decision about whether a town 
had violated the free exercise rights of members of a 
church practicing the Santeria religion, Justice Scalia 
explained that “comparison with other fi elds supports, 
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rather than undermines, the conclusion we draw to-
day.” Comparison with these other fi elds also supports 
the understanding of “secular purpose” articulated by 
the majority in McCreary.
 Inquiries into governmental and legislative purpose 
form a standard component of constitutional deci-
sion-making, particularly in the race discrimination 
context, where the Court, in the 1976 case Washington 
v. Davis, announced that a particular offi cial action 
or law must both be motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose and result in a disparate racial impact to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In considering race-based claims, the 
Court has often looked to the particular series of events 
leading up to the challenged decision in determining 
whether the government acted in accordance with 
a discriminatory purpose. Simi-
larly, in McCreary, Justice Souter 
exhaustively described the three 
successive Ten Commandments 
displays—each seemingly at-
tempting to further mask the 
non-secular purpose—as well 
as the counties’ resolutions with 
regard to them in reaching the 
conclusion that the government’s purpose was not 
secular.
 The majority also specifi ed that the counties’ pur-
pose needed to be “predominantly” secular, rather than 
simply motivated partly by religion and partly by other 
secular motives. Although Justice Scalia excoriated this 
requirement as a new and unjustifi ed invention, the 
language of predominance is familiar from the racial 
gerrymandering arena. Likewise, the “searching review 
of the [legislative] record” that the Court performed 
to ascertain whether or not a secular purpose pre-
dominated echoed the reasoning undergirding a very 
different majority’s decision in 1997 in the City of 
Boerne v. Flores. In that case, which invalidated certain 
provisions of the federal Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, the majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Kennedy, and joined by Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, 
and Scalia, as well as Stevens and Ginsburg, scrutinized 
the legislative history to ascertain whether the measures 
Congress had taken were congruent and proportional 
with the attempt to remedy discrimination against 
religious groups and practitioners.
 It is, in addition, possible to reconcile the McCreary 
majority’s emphasis on secular governmental purpose 
with the outcome of the Texas capitol case. Whereas 
the sequence of successive exhibits in Kentucky and 
the counties’ legislative resolutions about them clearly 
evinced a predominantly sectarian purpose, the in-
stallation of the Ten Commandments monument in 
1961 did not carry with it such evident markers of 
non-secular purpose. Furthermore, the Court has, in 
the past, held that the religious implications of certain 
kinds of historical artifacts or practices have become 
worn away over time, thus neutralizing any initially 
sectarian motivations underlying them.
 The problem with the two Ten Commandments 
decisions, however, is that the Court refrained from 
attempting to bring them into accord. Justice Breyer, 
who did not concur in the plurality’s opinion in Van 
Orden, but cast the deciding vote, reached his determi-
nation through the exercise of “legal judgment” rather 
than invocation of the Court’s precedent. Although 
he explained that “the Texas display . . . might satisfy 
this Court’s more formal Establishment Clause tests” 
(emphasis added), he did not rely on these tests, or on 
the secular or non-secular purpose of those who erected 
the monument, but rather on “the basic purposes of the 
First Amendment’s Religion Clauses themselves.”
 The primary such purpose was, he opined, to 
avoid “religiously based divisiveness.” Because the 
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Ten Commandments monument on the lawn of the 
Texas Capitol had been challenged only once in forty 
years, he reasoned, “as a practical matter of degree this 
display is unlikely to prove divisive.” By contrast, a Su-
preme Court decision to remove such a marker “might 
well encourage disputes.” While some scholars have 
noted that the Court’s judgments 
rarely deviate substantially from 
the norms of the contemporary 
society, it is unusual to fi nd opin-
ions actually stating as their bases 
a desire to avoid constitutionally-
created confl ict.
 The vision articulated by Jus-
tice Breyer’s concurrence bears 
within it dangers similar to those 
entailed by Justice Scalia’s demagogic dissent in Mc-
Creary. Justice Scalia, in his most extreme judicial state-
ment yet in favor of governmental religious expression, 
signifi cantly commenced his opinion by invoking the 
events of September 11, then continued by explain-
ing that, in his view, government should be able to 
endorse a monotheistic God. It is perhaps not inci-
dental that, in this rhetoric, the war on terror and the 
culture wars are not here too far apart. The dissent is 
also fi rmly—almost shamelessly—majoritarian, insist-
ing that 97% of Americans who believe in religion 
are part of a monotheistic faith, and citing an Act of 
Congress reaffi rming the religious language in the 
Pledge of Allegiance. Neither the Constitution, nor 
the Court’s interpretation of it, are incompatible with 
the value that these religious practitioners place upon 
monotheism. The Constitution simply assumes that 
in America, a place where religious dissenters sought 
refuge and where even the original state constitu-
tion of South Carolina specifi cally provided a way in 
which fi fteen men could together form a new sect, it 
is unnecessary for government to impose a particular 
vision of religion, or a particular version of the Ten 
Commandments (which differ signifi cantly among 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews), on everyone else.
 Justice Scalia’s opinion, despite its majoritarian 
emphasis, is far from avoiding divisiveness, but, per-
haps, neither is Justice Breyer’s. When the Court, as 
it did last fall, issues decisions that seem so incon-
sistent to the “reasonable observer”—the same one 
from whose vantage point the assessment of secular 
purpose occurs—it cannot help but cause consterna-
tion among people of all persuasions. This is even 
more the case when the Court eschews the attempt to 
apply enduring if evolving principles and substitutes 
for them “legal judgment,” however good or experi-
enced that judgment might be. Whether or not the 
government’s purpose is secular, the Court’s seems to 
be anti-strife.
Workers prepare to move the Ten Commandments 
monument from public view at the judicial building 
in Montgomery. 
The Constitution simply assumes that in America it 
is unnecessary for government to impose a particular 
vision of religion, or a particular version of the Ten 
Commandments, on everyone else.
Bernadette A. Meyler 
is an assistant professor 
of law at Cornell Law 
School.
